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The Foreign Trademark Owner Living with American
Products Liability Law
Arthur Schwartz*
When Americans think of France, they think of wine and per-
fume. When Frenchmen (or for that matter, business persons in any
foreign country) think of America, they think of litigation. Twelve
million lawsuits were filed in state courts between 1978 and 1983.1
The average products liability award increased from $345,000 to
more than $1,000,000 in ten years, 2 and the number of products lia-
bility suits filed in federal courts alone has tripled since 1960. 3
Whether a cause or an effect, there are three times as many lawyers
practicing now as there were in the 1950s, and it costs thirty-seven
times more to run the tort system than it did then.4
In order to appreciate the question of products liability as it in-
teracts with trademarks, the function of a mark must be appreciated.
A trademark identifies the goods of one manufacturer or merchant
and distinguishes them from those manufactured or sold by others. 5
That is, the mark denotes the source of the goods. There are two
ways a trademark owner can use his mark. One is as the actual man-
ufacturer and/or seller of the goods. The other, which is becoming
more common, is for the trademark owner to license or "permit"
the use of his mark on goods produced or services rendered by
others. Whether the trademark owner manufactures the goods him-
self, or the goods are provided by a licensee, seems to make little
difference to the public. Thus, when there is injury caused by a
product bearing a trademark, the injured party looks to wherever he
can find a "deep pocket." The trademark owner, whether the actual
manufacturer or not, is therefore a likely candidate.
I. Theories of Liability
To understand why and how the foreign or domestic trademark
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owner is liable for injury and damages caused, the various bases for
liability must be considered. The starting point is the often ex-
pounded premise that when a third person is injured through no
fault of his own, or when property is damaged by a product, legal
responsibility may well rest on the one who places the goods into the
channel of trade or the "stream of commerce." 6 Several theories
have been developed to achieve this result.
A. Breach of Warranty
An express warranty exists when, as part of the basis of the bar-
gain, there is 1) a written or oral statement of a fact or promise
which relates to the goods; 2) a description of the goods; or 3) a
sample or model of the goods. 7
An implied warranty, as imposed by the Uniform Commercial
Code, usually relates to the merchantability or fitness of a product
for the ordinary purpose for which the goods in question are used. 8
These theories are limited in their application because they usu-
ally extend only to a direct purchaser (i.e., one who has privity with
the manufacturer or seller), his family, or guests. 9 Warranties, how-
ever, can also come into play if the licensee impleads the licensor, or
brings a cross-claim against him.
B. Negligence
Negligence occurs essentially when one does not use reasonable
care in the design or manufacture of a product. Typically, the lack of
reasonable care is tied to a defendant's doing (or not doing) some-
thing a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have done (or
not have done) in the same or similar circumstances. The person
injured, or the owner of property that is damaged, must be someone
to whom the defendant owes some duty. The product in question
must have been defective or dangerous, and this must have been
known to the defendant. Finally, the defendant's acts of omission or
commission with respect to the product must be the proximate cause
of the injury. i0
C. Strict Liability
Both of the above theories lack the obvious appeal of strict lia-
bility, which, in various forms, is the law in many U.S. jurisdictions.
The theory of strict products liability was developed by the courts in
the interest of having the ultimate manufacturer protect life and
6 See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
7 U.C.C. § 2-313 (1968).
8 Id. § 2-314.
9 Id. § 2-318.
1) W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1970).
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safety (because it is difficult for the consumer to determine and
prove negligence), as well as of spreading the risk of loss. Section
402(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines strict liability as
follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.'
The product defects usually referred to are:
1) a manufacturing defect
2) a design defect
3) a defect in warnings or in the failure to warn of a danger. 12
D. Vicarious Liability
The term "vicarious liability" is applied to situations where, for
example, a franchisor gives apparent authority to a franchisee to act
for the franchisor. Section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency states the doctrine as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care
and skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to third per-
sons for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing
to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.'
3
In order to discuss trademark licensor liability properly, sec-
tion 400(D) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, often relied on in
U.S. trademark cases, must also be considered. This section reads as
follows:
One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by an-
other is subject to the same liability as though he were its
manufacturer. 14
II. The Stream of Commerce Approach
The term "stream of commerce" has been used extensively, be-
ginning over twenty years ago, whendiscussing where liability will be
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
12 Id.
I3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400(D) (1965).
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imposed, to denote those in the chain of responsibility for placing a
defective product in the stream of commerce. 15 Obviously, anyone
between the manufacturer and the injured party is "downstream,"
and the licensor is "upstream."
The often-cited "Stream of Commerce" case, Kaselv. Reming-
ton Arms Company, Inc.,16 involved an American injured by a defective
shotgun shell while in Mexico.1 7 The shell had been manufactured
by a Mexican licensee of Remington, that also owned a minority in-
terest in the Mexican company and had the right to inspect and con-
trol the products bearing the Remington trademark.' 8  The
California Court of Appeals held that the U.S. company was "an inte-
gral part of the composite business enterprise which placed the de-
fective shell in the stream of commerce."' 19
A. Control
The requirement that the trademark owner exercise control over
the quality of the goods sold or services rendered by a licensee is
now regularly used in trademark and franchise cases where the licen-
sor or franchisor is upstream from the point of injury.2 0 The appli-
cation of the stream of commerce approach seems perfectly logical in
trademark cases since "control" is synonymous with a trademark or
service mark license. The control requirement is actually a "Catch-
22" predicament for the trademark owner. Section 5 of the Lanham
Act provides that use by "related companies" inures to the benefit of
the trademark owner. Section 45 defines a "related company" as any
entity "who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or
applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the
goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." '2 1
Thus, in order for a trademark owner to maintain the validity of
its trademark, it is necessary that such owner control the quality of
goods or services offered under the trademark. The trademark
owner accordingly becomes a prime candidate for liability for injury
by a product sold under the trademark, whether manufactured by the
trademark owner or not.
B. Illustrative Cases
Cases from a variety of factual backgrounds illustrate the grad-
ual development of liability on the part of trademark licensors for
injuries caused by products made under license. The cases discussed
15 See Delaney v. Towmoter Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
'(' 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
17 Id. at 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
18 Id. at 717, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
19 Id. at 723, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
20 See, e.g., Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 352-53 (6th Cir. 1979).
21 Lanham Act §§ 5, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1982).
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below indicate how the "stream of commerce" concept grew into a
coherent body of law governing licensor's liability.
1. Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons, Co.
The Kasel case was followed in 1973 by Carter v. Joseph Bancroft
& Sons, Co. ,22 where the plaintiff was burned when a dress bearing
the defendant's fabric certification label caught fire. 23 There were
several theories presented from which to choose, namely strict lia-
bility, breach of warranty, and negligence.2 4 The court first deter-
mined that Bancroft was "sufficiently involved in the manufacturing
process to be a seller" as required by section 402(A). 2 5 In adopting
section 400 of the Restatement, the court quoted comment "d" as
follows:
Thus, one puts out a chattel as his own product when he puts it out
under his name or affixes to it his tradename or trademark. When
such identification is referred to on the label as an indication of the
quality or wholesomeness of the chattel, there is an added emphasis
that the user can rely upon the reputation of the person so
identified. 2
6
In discussing section 402(A) the court stated in a footnote:
It might be appropriate to point out that by providing the specifica-
tions and prescribing and controlling the quality standards of the
Ban-Lon fabric, defendants were involved in the manufacture of a
component, the Ban-Lon fabric that went into the final product of
the dress. In this regard, we note that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has declared that a manufacturer of a defective component
part of a product is liable under Section 402(A) for the injury to the
ultimate user.2 7
2. City of Hartford v. Associated Construction Co.
In City of Hartford v. Associated Construction Co. ,28 the Connecticut
court held in 1978 that the trademark owner might be held liable for
damages which resulted from a leaky roof in one of plaintiff's
schools.2 9 The damage was caused by faulty insulation which was
manufactured and installed by a contractor. The insulation base was
sold under the mark ALL-CRETE. The owner of the mark, Silbrico
Corporation, was a licensor and had entered into an agreement with
22 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
23 Id. at 1106.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26 360 F. Supp. at 1107.
27 Id.
28 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d 390 (1978).
29 Id. Defendant demurred to the complaint, saying that plaintiff had failed to allege,
as an essential element of a strict liability cause of action, that the product had reached the
owner in substantially the same condition in which it was sold. The court overruled the
demurrer, agreeing with plaintiff's contention that defendant could be subject to liability
because it licensed its product and the right to control the quality of the product.
1987]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Associated Construction Co., a franchisee. Silbrico licensed Associ-
ated to use the mark and provided instructions for manufacturing
the product. Further, Silbrico furnished one of the key ingredients
in the insulation, although that ingredient was not necessarily the
cause of the product defect. 30
As is often the case, the named defendant, Associated Construc-
tion, was out of business, and it was necessary for the city of Hartford
to look to Silbrico. The court followed Kasel and held for Hartford,
on the rationale that, "as long as the franchisor or trademark licen-
sor can be said to be a link in the marketing enterprise which placed
a defective product within the stream of commerce, there is no logi-
cal reason in refusing to apply strict liability in tort to such an
entity.'' 3'
The court also cited section 400 of the Restatement, which im-
poses liability on one who "supplies another's chattel as his own
product."' 32 Further, the court recognized the importance of con-
trol, noting that in order to avoid abandonment of the trade-
mark when Silbrico licensed the mark, it was necessary for Silbrico to
control the licensee's use of it. 3
3. Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc.
Another section 400 case occurred in 1979, Connelly v. Uniroyal,
Inc. ,4 which involved an injury caused by a defective car tire.35 This
case bears certain similarities to Kasel in that the tire was manufac-
tured in Belgium by a Uniroyal subsidiary corporation who in turn
sold it to General Motors, which installed the tire on an Opel assem-
bled in Belgium.3 6 Uniroyal argued that it was not a seller since it
was not in the chain of distribution. The court held that as licensor of
the trademark Uniroyal played an integral part in placing the prod-
uct in the stream of commerce, and so was liable if the product
proved to be defective. 37
4. Kosters v. Seven-Up Co.
In Kosters v. Seven-Up Co. ,38 the plaintiff, injured by an exploding
soft drink bottle, sued the soft drink manufacturer, which had re-
tained the right of control over the carton design, even though it did
30 Id. at 208, 384 A.2d at 392.
31 Id. at 211, 384 A.2d at 394 (quoting Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 711, 723, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 321 (1972)).
32 Id. at 215, 384 A.2d at 376; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
33 34 Conn. Supp. at 212-13, 384 A.2d at 395-96.
34 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
35 Id. at 398, 389 N.E.2d at 157.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 411, 389 N.E.2d at 163.
38 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979).
380 [VOL.. 12
FOREIGN TRADEMARK OWNERS
not actually manufacture or supply the carton.3 9 The trial court in-
structed the jury to base any finding of liability on at least one of five
theories: negligence; implied warranty; inherently dangerous prod-
uct; opportunity to change design; and third-party beneficiary theory
of contract. 40 The court of appeals applied the "stream of com-
merce" theory to the facts surrounding the soft drink bottle's explo-
sion, noting that Seven-Up had controlled the type, style, size, and
design of the product.4 1 The appellate court, however, rejected this
Kasel-type analysis and remanded the case for the lower court to ap-
ply a four-factor test that the appellate court devised for determining
breach of implied warranty. The court stated that:
When a franchisor consents to the distribution of a defective prod-
uct bearing its name, the obligation of the franchisor to compensate
the injured consumer for breach of implied warranty, we think,
arises from several factors in combination: (1) the risk created by
approving for distribution an unsafe product likely to cause injury,
(2) the franchisor's ability and opportunity to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product and prevent the loss, (3) the consumer's
lack of knowledge of the danger, and (4) the consumer's reliance on
the trade name which gives the intended impression that the
franchisor is responsible for and stands behind the product. Liabil-
ity is based on the franchisor's control and the public's assumption,
induced by the franchisor's conduct, that it does in fact control and
vouch for the product.4 2
5. Harris v. The Aluminum Company of America
In Harris v. The Aluminum Company of America,43 a suit was brought
against Alcoa and Coca-Cola for injuries sustained when a twist-
off aluminum cap blew off the bottle and struck the plaintiff in the
eye. 44 The court followed Kosters, quoted the risk factors set out
above, and held both defendants liable for the plaintiff's injury. The
court held that under Virginia law an implied warranty extended to
the soft drink franchisor who caused the product to enter the
stream of commerce, engaged in extensive advertising to promote
sales of the product, and controlled its specifications and require-
ments, even though the franchisor did not manufacture the soft
drink bottle itself.4 5 Therefore, because Coca-Cola caused the defec-
tive product to enter the stream of commerce, it was subject to the
same liability as if it were a seller or manufacturer.
39 Id. at 350.
40 Id. at 350-51.
41 Id. at 352-53.
42 Id. at 353.
43 550 F. Supp. 1024 (W.D. Va. 1982).
44 Id. at 1025.
45 Id. at 1028.
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III. Precautions
Set out below are a variety of precautions which may be taken
by the trademark owner. Many of the measures are equally applica-
ble to trademark owners who are themselves manufacturers as well
as licensors.
A. Insurance
Authors and commentators routinely recommend that licen-
sors require their licensees to carry products liability insurance and
to name the licensor as a co-insured. 4 6 However, the subject cannot
be concluded with such a simple recommendation. One author has
said:
It is almost as if these requirements are routinely added as standard
"boiler plate" without any real consideration given to their impor-
tance and potential impact in each situation. Our view is that liabil-
ity amounts, formats, reasons, and special coverage should be
carefully examined and reviewed in each situation. 4 7
Because licensing personnel and their lawyers are normally
not sufficiently knowledgeable about insurance, it is becoming more
common to employ an insurance consultant. With that caveat, the
following comments are ventured:
1) The maximum coverage will obviously vary with the prod-
uct. While the upper limits of coverage are the first considera-
tion, the deductible limits are equally important and must be
specified. Too high a deductible can be almost as bad as no insur-
ance at all since it makes the licensee self-insured for a substantial
amount and can give a sense of false security to the unwary.
2) The licensor should always insist that it be named co-in-
sured. However, it is not uncommon for the licensee or its insurance
carrier to balk at the demand by noting that higher premiums will
be required to cover the licensor. This is frequently the case when
there is a "big name" licensor and a relatively small licensee, be-
cause such a licensor is perceived as taking an especially big risk in
licensing its products.
3) The licensor should always require proof of insurance.
Licensors in the United States have found that this is particularly
true when dealing with foreign licensees who are unfamiliar with
American practices. More than once, foreign licensees have signed
licenses with insurance clauses without knowing how to comply or
even giving a thought to compliance.
46 Anson, Product Liability Insurance: A Consitanti Observations, THE MERCHANDISING
REPORTER, May 1984, at 10.
47 Id. at 8.
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B. Self-Insurance
Many large companies with a wide variety of products are self-
insured, which is perfectly acceptable if they have sufficient finan-
cial strength. In addition, many large and small manufacturers are
selling products in the United States without any products liability
insurance. That they may be judgement-proof, for jurisdictional or
other reasons, should make their U.S. distributors or retailers cau-
tious in dealing with them.
C. Indemnifications/Personal Guarantees
The term "indemnification" typically covers a broad range of
protection for the licensor and is not merely limited to products lia-
bility. 48 Also, such a clause can be used in conjunction with in-
surance provisions to cover any other possible sources of liability. In
the same vein, personal guarantees can be included by principals
of the licensee when there is a question as to the viability of the
licensee itself.
D. Other Approaches
There are several additional approaches that can be tailored to
specific situations. These include sureties, specific term bank guar-
antees or letters of credit, and escrowed or designated assets which
are pledged or otherwise sequestered to provide a fund in the event
of products liability litigation.4 9
E. Liability Disclaimer
Although there is little doubt as to the invalidity of a disclaimer
vis-A-vis third parties, a provision disclaiming liability should be
valid against a counterclaim or impleader by the licensee, particu-
larly if both parties are adequately represented, deal in a com-
mercial setting, and are generally commercial equals.
F. Warnings
As manufacturers selling in the United States should have ade-
quate warnings where appropriate on a product, the licensor
should insist that the licensee also provide adequate warnings.
G. Compliance with Regulations and Standards
Various government agencies (OSHA, FDA, CPSC, as well as
state agencies) issue regulations. Trade and engineering associations
also set standards. The foreign manufacturer should be aware of
48 For example, patent, trade, and copyright infringement are also covered.
49 Anson, supra note 46, at 10.
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those which pertain to its products, and any license agreement
should require compliance with all applicable regulations and
standards.
H. Warranty Disclaimers
In certain types of licensing arrangements (usually where some-
thing other than simply a trademark is licensed), the licensor will
want to insert disclaimers of implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose.50 Although such disclaimers
probably will not operate against third parties, they may prove help-
ful against licensees.
L Termination/Revocation Clause
The licensor may possibly protect itself by retaining the right to
cancel the license if industry regulations or standards are not
complied with or if products liability claims are filed against the li-
censee or licensor. The latter possibility would only eliminate the
chance of future claims if it appeared that the likelihood of additional
claims being made against the licensor was sufficient to warrant ter-
mination of the entire agreement.
IV. Other Countries
To provide a point of departure for the foreign trademark
owner, a brief reference should be made to the situation in a few
other countries.
The biggest difference, compared to U.S. practice, is that the
contingency suit is at least frowned upon, and generally not even
available, in other countries. Whatever the merits of this policy
choice, it is apparent that if an injured party must retain legal coun-
sel in order to sue for damages, the number of such suits is greatly
diminished. This factor, in addition to the difference in substantive
laws, makes products liability suits outside the United States the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
A. European Economic Community
While not necessarily following the United States, the European
Economic Community seems to be creating generally parallel
provisions with regard to products liability. On July 25, 1985, the
Counsel of the European Communities adopted Directive 85/374
on the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Pro-
visions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products. 5' The Directive requires Member States to bring into
50 U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315, -316 (1968).
51 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29 (1985).
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force, within three years, the laws necessary to comply with its provi-
sions. 52 Its basic principle is that a producer is liable for damages
caused by his defective product, without the injured party's needing
to establish that the producer was negligent. The directive specif-
ically requires protection of the consumer and provides that "liability
should extend to importers of products into the Community and to
persons who present themselves as producers by affixing their
name, trademark, or other distinguishing feature, or who supply a
product the producer of which cannot be identified." 53
A producer "means the manufacturer of a finished product, the
producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component
part who by putting his name, trademark or other distinguishing fea-
ture on the product presents himself as its producer." 54 The latter
portion approximates section 400 of the Restatement (Second).
Article 6 of the Directive sets out when a product is defec-
tive as follows:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which
a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account,
including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the
product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason
that a better product is subsequently put into circulation.
55
B. Other European Countries
At the present time, strict products liability is still the excep-
tion among the European countries, as in the case of West Ger-
many's statutorily imposed strict liability for drug manufacturers. 56
At least in theory, France has achieved true strict liability by imput-
ing to a manufacturer knowledge of any defect in any product it pro-
duces and, in addition, by imposing a continuing duty on the
manufacturer after the product has left its control.5 7 The law may
not actually be strictly enforced, however, because only certain
French courts have extended article 1384 to impose a kind of abso-
lute liability on manufacturers.
52 Id. at 33.
53 Id. at 29.
54 Id. at 30.
55 Id. at 31.
56 Revised Pharmaceutical Law, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I 2445 (W. Ger.).
57 CODE CIVIL art. 1384, 1645 (Fr.).
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C. Canada
Fridman's text, Sale of Goods in Canada, provides the following
encapsulation of Canadian product liability law:
The doctrine of product liability subjects one who sells goods which
are harmful to a consumer or his property to liability to the ulti-
mate user for damage thereby caused if the goods are expected to,
and do, reach the consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which they are sold. This is so even if the consumer has not
bought the goods from, or entered into any contractual relation
with, the seller. 5 8
There have been two cases of interest that discuss licensor
liability:
1. Fraser v. U-Need-A Cab, Ltd.
The plaintiff in Fraser v. U-Need-A Cab, Ltd. 59 requested a taxi
over a direct-line telephone labelled U-Need-A Cab. The dispatcher
answered "U-Need-A Cab," and sent a vehicle that, although inde-
pendently owned and operated, bore the uniform colors and name of
the defendant company. The defendant's fleet was largely staffed by
independent cabbies who paid a monthly fee for the dispatcher's
services, and were required to use defendant's "insignia," including
a sign plate with telephone number. 60
The Supreme Court of Ontario, a provincial trial-level court, in
a narrow holding, found that the defendant's contract with Mrs. Fra-
ser carried the implied warranty that the cab was reasonably safe for
use. 6 1 The court found the defendant liable for breaching its im-
plied warranty by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that the
cab was safe. 62 The court relied on the appearance of defendant's
trademark and its advertising, and specifically stated that it was not
applying the principle of vicarious liability. 63
2. Home Service Club of Canada
In a recent case, Percival v. Mayes, 64 the Supreme Court of Onta-
rio decided in favor of a franchisor on the facts, but provided much
dicta in favor of franchisor liability. It is understood that the case is
now on appeal.
Toronto Home Services, Ltd., did business under the mark
HOME SERVICE CLUB OF CANADA, as well as through local
58 Burshtein, Liability of Trademark Licensors, LES NOVELLES, June 1984, at 94 (quoting
FRIDMAN, SALE OF GOODS IN CANADA 489 (1973)).
59 43 O.R.2d 389 (1984), aff'd on other grounds, 50 O.R.2d 281 (1985).
6o Id. at 390-92.
61 Id. at 396.
62 Id. at 397.
63 Id. at 400.
(4 Percival v. Mayes, Supreme Court of Ontario (unreported, Boland, J., Mar. 6,
1986).
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"clubs." The Club operated as does the American Automobile Asso-
ciation, by referring members to local plumbers, contractors, etc.,
who did home repair work.6 5
The court held that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to
have assumed that the local club was a division of the franchisor,
particularly since a cardholder could move from one "club" area to
another. Thus" it would have been reasonable for someone to rely
on the guarantee of the franchisor in taking the recommendation of
a local club. 6 6
V. Conclusion
A foreign concern claiming rights to a trademark in the United
States can expect to be held liable for injuries caused not only by the
goods it manufactures and sells in the United States but also by
goods sold (or services rendered) by someone licensed under the
trademark. It also appears that at least European and Canadian
trademark owners will soon, if they are not already, be held to a simi-
lar standard in their own countries.
The institution in Europe of strict liability for damage caused by
goods sold or services rendered under a given company's trademark
may help solve old problems of international licensing even as it cre-
ates new ones. For U.S. licensees of trademarked European prod-
ucts, the initiation of standards of liability in Europe similar to those
in the United States should make European firms more cognizant of
the risks they are taking when granting U.S. licenses, and corre-
spondingly more adept at protecting themselves from heavy liability,
through insurance, for example. Likewise, U.S. licensors should be-
gin to find their European licensees more sophisticated in dealing
with certain refinements of U.S. license agreements. As familiarity
increases on each side of the Atlantic with the terms of liability which
exist on the other side, foreign businesspersons, when they think of
the United States, will now at least be able to think in more precise
terms.
65 Id. at 2.
66 Id. at 9-10.
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